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“[T]here ought to be no Power over the Consciences of men . . . .”
—Thomas Hobbes1 
“[E]veryone is by absolute natural right the master of his own 
thoughts . . . .”
—Baruch Spinoza2 
* Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Department of Political Science,
University of Toronto at Mississauga. 
 1. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 480 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
Rev. Student Edition 1996) (1651). 
 2. BARUCH SPINOZA, THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL TREATISE 231 (Samuel Shirley
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1998) (1670). 
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“And such is the nature of the Understanding, that it cannot be 
compell’d to the belief of any thing by outward force.” 
—John Locke3 
“[L]ike you, I am indignant that the faith of everyone is not in the 
most perfect liberty, and that man dares control the interior of 
consciences where he is unable to penetrate; as if it depended on us 
to believe or not to believe in matters where demonstration has no 
place, and that reason could ever be subjected to authority.”
—Jean-Jacques Rousseau4 
I. INTRODUCTION
The organizers of this symposium have posed the question: is the idea 
of conscience fundamentally rooted in religious commitments?  This 
question inevitably draws us back to the seventeenth century, for that is
when the discourse of conscience ultimately originated.  And when we 
consult the most important sources from that epoch, we get, I believe, a 
clear answer to the question, although it may not be the answer that the
organizers of the symposium anticipated when they conceived the theme
of this gathering.5 
 3. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 27 (James H. Tully ed.,
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1983) (1689). 
4. Letter from Rousseau to Voltaire (Aug. 18, 1756), in 3 THE COLLECTED
WRITINGS OF ROUSSEAU 108, 119 (Roger D. Masters & Christopher Kelly eds., Judith R. 
Bush et al. trans., 1992). 
5. In a statement of the theme of the “Freedom of Conscience: Stranger in a Secular 
Land?” symposium, e-mailed to me by Professors Larry A. Alexander and Steven D. 
Smith at the time I was invited to participate, they wrote:
 Although “freedom of conscience” has been one of the long-standing and 
central commitments of liberal constitutionalism, the commitment arose in a
world in which religious assumptions figured prominently in the framework or
worldview within which political issues involving religion and conscience were 
understood and debated.  “Conscience” was commonly conceived to be a religious 
faculty, and “freedom of conscience” was understood in religious terms.  Today, by
contrast, such matters are typically considered within a more secular framework.
E-mail from Larry A. Alexander, Professor of Law, Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, and
Steven D. Smith, Professor of Law, Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, to Ronald Beiner, 
Chair, Dep’t of Political Sci., Univ. of Toronto at Mississauga (Mar. 12, 2009, 11:40
EST) (on file with author). The purpose of this paper is not to “refute” but, more modestly, 
1108
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The theme of conscientious belief arises in three pivotal seventeenth 
century thinkers: Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke.  All three thinkers 
emphasize that there is no point in trying to discipline belief because one 
cannot help believing what one believes.  But Hobbes and Spinoza open 
up this space for conscience mainly in order to promote intellectual
freedom—a “freedom of philosophizing.”6  It is only with Locke that 
this theme turns towards privileging sectarian conscience.  In other words,
the core doctrine of conscience is given almost the same formulation by
Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke—and as one can see from the fourth
epigraph of this paper, it was given an identical formulation by Rousseau
as well.  However, the role accorded to the notion of religious conscience is
not equally central in these three theories.  For all three, conscience
pertains to what cannot be touched by coercion because the conviction 
of what is believed is inherently unshakeable.  At the most fundamental 
level, conscience is a matter of conscientious judgment, and this need
not be associated with any particular religious commitment; it can just as
well be the case that one’s conscientious judgment is that all religions
are a product of ignorance and credulity.7  This offers a way of disengaging
the problem of conscience from the preoccupation with religious conscience. 
The historically prior issue is that of conscientious intellectual commitment. 
II. THOMAS HOBBES
The purpose of this essay is to pursue three important iterations of the 
same theme.  Let us start with the first iteration: Hobbes.  One does not 
normally think of Hobbes as a theorist of conscience.  Quite the
contrary, he is a theorist of sovereignty—of the unbounded authority of
merely to raise questions about the historical claim contained in these sentences by Alexander 
and Smith. 
6. See BARUCH SPINOZA, THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL TREATISE xlix (Samuel Shirley 
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 2001) (1670). This theme is highlighted in Spinoza’s
subtitle. 
7. Jeremy Waldron argues persuasively that although Locke tries to exclude 
atheists from the argument for respecting conscience in A Letter Concerning Toleration, 
Locke’s argument, centered as it is on the notion of the impossibility of compelling 
belief, has precisely the same force for atheists as it does for religionists. See  JEREMY
WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY 231–32 (2002); cf. id. at 235 (“[I]t does not
make sense for Locke to [deny to] . . . the atheist . . . [the aspect of toleration proscribing 
forcible imposition of beliefs]—since there is little prospect of forcible conversion . . . .”).
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the Leviathan, not only with respect to the demands of political order, 
but also with respect to religion and the requirements of the civic cult.
The image of Hobbes as a theorist very far removed from an interest in
conscience or toleration is expressed quite powerfully in the discussion 
of public worship in Leviathan, chapter 31.8 
[S]eeing a Common-wealth is but one Person, it ought . . . to exhibite to God but one
Worship; which then it doth, when it commandeth it to be exhibited by Private 
men, Publiquely.  And this is Publique Worship; the property whereof, is to be
Uniforme: For those actions that are done differently, by different men, cannot 
be said to be a Publique Worship.  And therefore, where many sorts of Worship
be allowed, proceeding from the different Religions of Private men, it cannot be
said there is any Publique Worship, nor that the Common-wealth is of any Religion
at all.9 
The emphasis on uniformity in this text easily suggests that Hobbes is
hostile to religious pluralism and therefore—it would seem to follow—is 
hostile to the intrinsically pluralized claims of conscience.10  But this 
perhaps does not tell the full story.  Putting the emphasis on public rather 
than on uniform in our reading of the above quotation highlights the 
implication that private conviction at variance with that public worship
does no harm to the state and its interest in outward conformity—as 
Hobbes asserts very explicitly in other texts, as we will see below.  This
implication is in fact intimated in an earlier passage in chapter 31: 
[T]here is a Publique, and a Private Worship.  Publique, is the Worship that a 
Common-wealth performeth, as one Person.  Private, is that which a Private person
exhibiteth.  Publique, in respect of the whole Common-wealth, is Free; but in respect
of Particular men it is not so.  Private, is in secret Free; but in the sight of the
multitude, it is never without some Restraint, either from the Lawes, or from the
Opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of Liberty.11 
Hobbes thinks that unless there is a uniformly prescribed mode of public
worship, the unitary body politic loses its personality, but public worship 
does not exclude forms of private worship, provided that these secret
religions are careful to stay out of the public eye.  Provided that the
8. Jeremy Waldron offers a reading of chapter 31 in Jeremy Waldron, Hobbes on 
Public Worship, in  TOLERATION AND ITS LIMITS 31, 33–47 (Melissa S. Williams &
Jeremy Waldron eds., 2008).  In my view, Waldron’s interpretation puts too much
emphasis on the idea of pleasing God and not enough emphasis on the strictly political 
imperative of unifying the commonwealth. 
 9. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 252–53. 
10. Cf. Alan Ryan, A More Tolerant Hobbes?, in  JUSTIFYING TOLERATION 37, 39 
(Susan Mendus ed., 1988) (“Defenders of toleration—usually expressed as ‘liberty of
conscience’—were friends of religion.  Hobbes had no time for liberty of conscience . . . . 
Hobbes did not have an explicit doctrine of toleration, in the sense of ‘liberty of
conscience . . . .’”).
 11. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 249. 
1110
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canons of public worship are satisfied, Hobbes has little interest in 
policing what believers think within the interiority of their minds or
consciences—an interiority that is out of “the sight of the multitude”12— 
or even within the interiority of their own households.  What counts is 
the imperative of shared participation in political authority—not what
people actually believe—so a public display of loyalty to the civil cult 
suffices; deeper scrutiny of inner convictions is beside the point.  Indeed,
Carl Schmitt was of the view that Hobbes’s distinction between private 
belief and public worship was, whether wittingly or unwittingly, a decisive 
wedge that ultimately led to all the rot associated with the liberal tradition, 
thereby subverting genuine social and political order in Europe.13  Schmitt’s
reading of Hobbes may be extreme, but it does highlight quite powerfully
Hobbes’s subtle and often unperceived affinities with what came to be
Lockean tolerationism.
If sovereignty were the fundamental principle of political life, one 
would expect a diminished appreciation for the claims of individual 
conscience or regard those claims as subversive of the exigencies of
political order.  And that is in fact what Hobbes seems to be suggesting 
when he polemicizes against conscience in Leviathan, chapter 7: appeals
to conscience involve a pretense to a possession of the truth in excess of 
what human beings are actually equipped to obtain and therefore is tied
to forms of human vanity.14  “[M]en, vehemently in love with their own 
new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain 
them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of Conscience, as
if they would have it seem unlawfull, to change or speak against 
them . . . .”15 But this polemical challenge to the rhetoric of conscience 
does not tell the full story of Hobbes’s attitude towards claims of
conscience.  Immediately before the text just quoted, there is another 
passage that strikes a different note.  Hobbes refers to the etymology of
conscience, suggesting not a unique access to what one claims to know 
12. Id.
13. See CARL SCHMITT, THE LEVIATHAN IN THE STATE THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES
74 (George Schwab & Erna Hilfstein trans., 1996).  For an interpretation of Hobbes that 
also highlights proto-liberal aspects of Hobbes’s political philosophy, see Alan Ryan, 
Hobbes, Toleration, and the Inner Life, in THE NATURE OF POLITICAL THEORY 197, 201– 
17 (David Miller & Larry Siedentop eds., 1983), and Ryan, supra note 10, at 50–51, 56– 
58. 
14. See HOBBES, supra note 1, at 48. 
15. Id.
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but rather a joint knowing, or coknowledge so to speak, of facts about 
the world.16  With respect to this collective consciousness, Hobbes affirms
the rights of conscience:
[B]ecause [human beings participating in conscience understood as coknowing] are
fittest witnesses of the facts . . . it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act,
for any man to speak against his Conscience; or to corrupt, or force another so
to do: Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been always hearkened unto
very diligently in all times.17 
Evidently, there is a double aspect to the profession of conscience for 
Hobbes.  It can be a rhetoric by which individuals with idiosyncratic and 
often unsound opinions pretend to have a knowledge they do not possess. 
But it can also stand for a shared knowledge that it would be illegitimate 
to force knowers to disavow.  Conscience is both a mask for unfounded 
claims to knowledge and a way of upholding that shared possession of 
(scientific) knowledge that finds itself subject to illegitimate coercion. 
One may already suspect, right from this initial discussion of conscience,
that appeals to conscience within the sphere of religion correspond to the
(bogus) kind against which Hobbes polemicizes, whereas (what one can 
call) cognitive conscience corresponds to the authentic form of conscience
that Hobbes wishes to uphold. 
Hobbes’s tendency to identify the problem of conscience with the
problem of intellectual freedom is also supported by a discussion of 
conscience that occurs near the end of the book—in chapter 46. The 
context is an extensive catalogue of civil evils flowing from “[v]ain
[p]hilosophy, and [f]abulous [t]raditions.”18  The text is worth quoting at
length.
There is another Errour in their19 Civill Philosophy . . . to extend the power of the
Law, which is the Rule of Actions onely, to the very Thoughts, and Consciences
of men, by Examination, and Inquisition of what they Hold, notwithstanding the 
Conformity of their Speech and Actions: By which, men are either punished for 
answering the truth of their thoughts, or constrained to answer an untruth for 
fear of punishment.  It is true, that the Civill Magistrate, intending to employ a 
Minister in the charge of Teaching, may enquire of him, if hee bee content to Preach
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 458 (italics omitted).
19. Hobbes does not really specify here who “they” are whose false civil philosophy
must be repelled.  Different possible interpretations are suggested by the polemical pages 
that precede this paragraph: (a) those who are bewitched by the false philosophy of Aristotle
and his Scholastic followers; (b) adherents of the Catholic Church; (c) more broadly,
those in the grip of what soon after Hobbes came to be called “priestcraft”; or, (d) according 
to the broadest interpretation, all human beings who have not yet embraced the true civil 
philosophy. See id. at 468–71. 
1112
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such, and such Doctrines; and in case of refusall, may deny him the employment:
But to force him to accuse himselfe of Opinions, when his Actions are not by
Law forbidden, is against the Law of Nature; and especially in them, who teach, 
that a man shall bee damned to Eternall and extream torments, if he die in a
false opinion concerning an Article of the Christian Faith.  For who is there, that
knowing there is so great danger in an error, whom the naturall care of himself, 
compelleth not to hazard his Soule upon his own judgement, rather than that of
any other man that is unconcerned in his damnation?20 
Political theorists who are accustomed to harboring a fairly simple 
picture of how Locke as a defender of the politics of conscience relates 
to Hobbes as the representative of a radically opposed political vision 
have good reason to be astonished at how much of the argument of A
Letter Concerning Toleration is anticipated in the final sentences of this 
quotation.21  One can go further: if we did not already know that this was
a quotation from Leviathan, we could easily assume that they were
sentences composed by Locke! 
But I want to redirect the focus of attention from the celebration of 
conscience in the familiar religious sense at the end of this paragraph to 
what I suggest is the more fundamental sense of conscience as intellectual 
conscience at the beginning of the paragraph.  The appeal to conscience
is very deliberately situated in the phrase “the very Thoughts, and
Consciences of men,”22 and the importance of (intellectual) conscience 
as something sacred is driven home with greatest force by reflecting on 
the Spanish Inquisition as the most egregious violation of this sacredness— 
a mental inner sanctum, so to speak.  The main reason why one must
stand up for conscience is that clerical authorities are not content merely 
to exercise dominion over the souls of their own adherents; they also 
insist on policing inner conviction in the society as a whole.23  Therefore, 
20. Id. at 471–72; cf. id. at 480 (“[I]t is unreasonable in them, who teach there is 
such danger in every little Errour, to require of a man endued with Reason of his own, to 
follow the Reason of any other man, or of the most voices of many other men; Which is 
little better, then to venture his Salvation at crosse and pile [heads or tails].”).
21. For a forceful account that places Hobbes and Locke in much closer proximity
to each other than scholars usually do, see Richard Tuck, Hobbes and Locke on
Toleration, in THOMAS HOBBES AND POLITICAL THEORY 153 (Mary G. Dietz ed., 1990). 
The same volume features a critical response to Tuck’s interpretation.  See James Farr,
Atomes of Scripture: Hobbes and the Politics of Biblical Interpretation, in  THOMAS 
HOBBES AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra, at 172, 188–91. 
 22. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 471. 
23. On the theme of what can and cannot be rightly policed by civil authorities, see
id. at 52 (“The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean, obscene, 
grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verball discourse cannot do . . . .”).
 1113
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what is ultimately at stake for Hobbes in the politics of conscience is the 
issue of intellectual integrity and the possibility for scholars, philosophers, 
and scientists to think freely in penetrating the secrets of nature. 
The next chapter of the book, chapter 47, again gives expression to the 
double-sided character of the Hobbesian view of conscience that we 
commented on above in the context of chapter 7.24  It is from this
memorable discussion in chapter 47 that we have drawn our epigraph
from Hobbes at the head of this paper, and the context for that epigraph 
is worth reviewing.25  In this famous passage, Hobbes speaks of three
“knot[s] upon [Christian] Liberty” and how these three knots were in
turn “dissolved” in England from Queen Elizabeth I to the English Civil 
War.26  The first knot is the power of excommunication imposed as a 
quasi-political punishment for disobedience.27 The second knot is Episcopal 
hierarchy.28  The third knot is the papacy.29  Elizabeth dissolved the third 
knot.  The Presbyterian revolt in the early stages of the English Civil 
There is a natural distinction here between what is secret and what is public, hence the
project of an “Inquisition” into these secret thoughts constitutes for Hobbes a violation of
“the Law of Nature.”  Id. at 471.  This account of secret thoughts also links up—fairly
obviously—with the notion of secret and therefore free private worship discussed above. 
See id. at 249; supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.  Chapter 42 from Leviathan
includes additional important language: “[I]nternall Faith is in its own nature invisible, 
and consequently exempted from all humane jurisdiction; whereas the words, and actions
that proceed from it, as breaches of our Civill obedience, are injustice both before God 
and Man.”  HOBBES, supra note 1, at 360.  Farr also cites part of this particularly
important language.  See Farr, supra note 21, at 195 n.93. 
24. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
25. See HOBBES, supra note 1, at 478–80. 
26. Id. at 479.  Hobbes’s presentation of himself here as a defender of “Christian 
Liberty” may seem highly paradoxical—although it is not the only place in his work
where he presents himself in this way. For example, Stephen Holmes highlights the
interesting puzzle raised by the text in the Epistle Dedicatory to Leviathan, in which 
“Hobbes claims to advocate a middle way between ‘too great Liberty’ and ‘too
much Authority.’  How can there be too much authority for Hobbes?”  Stephen Holmes, 
Introduction to THOMAS HOBBES, BEHEMOTH OR THE LONG PARLIAMENT, at xlii (Ferdinand
Tönnies ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1990) (1889); see also HOBBES, supra note 1, at 3. 
Behemoth’s account of the opposing religious tyrannies of Papism and Calvinism might 
suggest a different solution than the one Holmes proposes.  Could Hobbes’s thought 
have been the following—that in comparison with Papal tyranny on the one side, see 
Holmes, supra, at 21, 172, and Presbyterian tyranny, or anarchy-cum-tyranny, on the
other side, see id. at 169, even absolutist monarchy—with its more modest claims on the 
souls of its subjects—presents itself as a moderate compromise between liberty and 
authority?  Hobbes’s presentation of himself as a defender of “Christian Liberty,” 
HOBBES, supra note 1, at 479, is one of many indications that Hobbes is playing a very
complicated game and that one should be on guard against taking his seemingly simple 
doctrines at face value.
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War dissolved the second knot.  And the triumph of the Independents over 
the Presbyterians dissolved the first knot.  This leaves the impression, 
which Hobbes more or less asserts explicitly, that the outcome as of
1651, with Independents in charge of the regime, is a vindication of 
Christian liberty—one that Hobbes himself pretty much endorses.30  The
question, then, is whether there is a fourth knot that has not yet been
dissolved.  Does Independency represent the final triumph of Christian
liberty, or is it too part of the problem?31  My suggestion is that Hobbes, 
in this text, once again presents himself both as a defender of the politics 
of conscience and, at least implicitly, as a critic of it.  To spell out my
interpretation a bit less cryptically: writing his book during the regime of
Cromwell, and soon to return to England as a citizen of the Puritan 
commonwealth, it was probably not politic for Hobbes to fulminate 
against the Independents in the way that he did against Catholics and
Presbyterians.  This yields Hobbes’s strong pro-toleration line, with its 
surprising conclusion that the triumph of Independency “is perhaps the
best.”32   But it could hardly have been Hobbes’s view that appeals to 
conscience on the part of radical Protestants were politically innocent 
amidst the turmoil of the 1640s.  If this reading of Hobbes is correct, it 
implies a crucial distinction between, on the one hand, the bad forms of
30. Hence the famous passage: “And so we are reduced to the Independency of the 
Primitive Christians to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best:
Which, if it be without contention, . . . is perhaps the best . . . .” HOBBES, supra note 1, at 
479–80.  Hobbes removed the passage from the post-Restoration Latin version of
Leviathan, which further bolsters the suspicion that his endorsement of the Independents 
was opportunistic rather than principled.  See Farr, supra note 21, at 196 n.94. 
31. My own view basically coincides with that expressed by Farr.  See Farr, supra
note 21, at 189–90.  Independency, “‘if it be without contention . . . is perhaps the best.’” Id.
at 189 (emphasis added) (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 711 (C.B. Macpherson
ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651)); see also HOBBES, supra note 1, at 479–80.  But is the 
qualification satisfied?  Was there any lack of contention among the sectaries of the 
1640s? Cf. J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE, AND TIME 181 (1971) (referring to the 
“Erastian realization that the struggle against sectaries was a second front of the war 
against papists”); see generally id. at 187, 192–93, 197.  One could say that the fourth 
knot consists in religionists thinking that their opinions are not subject to the larger
imperatives of political order and civil authority.  One cannot enjoy Christian liberty if 
society is in a state of civil contention, and one cannot avoid civil contention if the rights 
of conscience are being abused by radical sects.  Consider also the brilliant summary of
the core teaching of Leviathan quoted by Pierre Bayle.  See  PIERRE BAYLE, POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 87–88 (Sally L. Jenkinson ed., 2000).  It would certainly be hard to square a 
doctrine of religious liberty with Hobbes’s teaching as thus encapsulated. 
 32. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 479–80. 
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conscience that had brought about the summum malum in England in the 
decade before Leviathan was published and, on the other hand, the good
forms of conscience that had to be liberated from the Inquisitors who
ruled Christian Europe.  In the same paragraph in which Hobbes affirms 
that “there ought to be no Power over the Consciences of men,” he very
pointedly warns against the folly of thinking that any good purpose would 
be served “by suppression of the Naturall Sciences, and of the Morality
of Naturall Reason.”33  Hobbes surely thinks that the rights of conscience
were abused by the holy anarchists who helped provoke the English Civil 
War, but this does not mean that conscience per se is not a legitimate
source of human claims.34  In short, Hobbes is far more sympathetic to 
the idea of conscience when he associates it with communities of natural
scientists than when he associates it with the radical sects that first
subverted and then appropriated sovereignty in the tumultuous decade 
between 1641 and 1651.
III. BARUCH SPINOZA
Next we turn to Spinoza.  Publication of the Theological-Political 
Treatise in 1670 is exactly equidistant in time between the publication of 
Leviathan in 1651 and A Letter Concerning Toleration in 1689.  The
subtitle of the book already announces that “freedom of philosophizing”
is a defining concern of Spinoza’s political philosophy.35  Chapter 20 of
the Theological-Political Treatise is virtually a manifesto on behalf of 
toleration and conscience, but Spinoza makes clearer than either Hobbes 
or Locke that the respect for religious conscience in its pluralism hangs 
on a logically prior concern for mental or intellectual freedom.36  In that
sense, Spinoza forms a bridge between Hobbes’s concern with intellectual 
liberty and Locke’s concern for religious toleration. 
Like Locke, Spinoza places tremendous emphasis on the idea of the 
futility of trying to coerce the inner judgments of the mind.  One thinks
what one thinks, and the judgment formed cannot be penetrated by external
33. Id. at 480.  It is natural to read this as a reference back to the denunciation of 
the Inquisition. See id. at 471.  For an excellent account of the general project of 
Enlightenment in Hobbes, see generally DAVID JOHNSTON, THE RHETORIC OF LEVIATHAN
(1986). 
34. Vindicating the first half of this double thesis would require a detailed 
interpretation of Behemoth.  I try to develop such an interpretation in chapter 6 of my
book.  See RONALD BEINER, CIVIL RELIGION: A DIALOGUE IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY ch. 6 (2011). 
 35. See SPINOZA, supra note 6. 
36. Id. at 230–38. 
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force.  Spinoza tends to identify power and right, so that if the tyrant 
lacks the power to coerce people’s ideas, he thereby also lacks the right
to do so.37  This is actually a pretty weak argument.  We know today 
from our experience of totalitarian states as well as totalitarian political 
movements that powers of altering or manipulating people’s thinking
are available.38  There is no guarantee that in every instance individuals 
will fall victim to this external manipulation, but equally there is no 
guarantee that they will not.  Brainwashing is not merely an invented
possibility; sometimes people are brainwashed by tyrannical states or
other agencies of social-political power.  So Spinoza offers a rather shaky
empirical foundation for what is nonetheless a view of the inviolability 
of mental life that is normatively very compelling.  Whether tyrants can
or cannot mold our thinking, it ought not to be normatively acceptable
for them to do it. 
Let us look at some of the texts.  Here is the first paragraph of chapter 
20 of the Theological-Political Treatise: 
If minds could be as easily controlled as tongues, every government would be 
secure in its rule, and need not resort to force; for every man would conduct 
himself as his rulers wished, and his views as to what is true or false, good or
bad, fair or unfair, would be governed by their decision alone.  But . . . it is impossible 
for the mind to be completely under another’s control; for no one is able to
transfer to another his natural right or faculty to reason freely and to form his 
own judgment on any matters whatsoever, nor can he be compelled to do
so.  Consequently, a government that attempts to control men’s minds is 
regarded as tyrannical, and a sovereign is thought to wrong his subjects and 
infringe their right when he seeks to prescribe for every man what he should
accept as true and reject as false, and what are the beliefs that will inspire him
with devotion to God.  All these are matters belonging to individual right, which
no man can surrender even if he should wish.39 
At the start of the next paragraph, Spinoza does concede that judgment is 
subject to being influenced by others and that therefore the issue of
37. Id. at 230.  Spinoza’s illiberal-sounding formula is “the right of sovereigns is
determined by their power.”  Id. at 231.  The power to shape the inner judgments of the 
mind is lacking and therefore so is the right to do so.  Spinoza seems—paradoxically—to
be trying to found his liberalism on the antiliberal idea that political right extends as far 
as political power.  That is, the power of tyrants has much more stringent limits than they
would wish, and therefore it is simply a counsel of political prudence for them to 
acknowledge the relevant implications with respect to the rights of conscience. 
38. Compare the argument directed against Locke in Brian Leiter, Foundations of
Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect?, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 935, 941–42 (2010). 
 39. SPINOZA, supra note 2, at 230; cf.  LOCKE, supra note 3, at 51 (“Liberty of
Conscience is every mans natural Right . . . .”). 
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whether our rights of judgment are empirically inviolable is not quite as 
black and white as the opening paragraph had suggested.40  Still, Spinoza
insists that the almost unlimited pluralism of human opinions—what one 
may even regard as a kind of seventeenth century anticipation of John 
Rawls’s notion of the “burdens of judgment”—tends to teach us that the
assertion of our own judgment belongs within the sphere of natural right 
in Spinoza’s rather idiosyncratic employment of the idea of natural right.41 
Let me quote another good statement of the core idea of Spinoza’s
liberalism:
It is not . . . the purpose of the state to transform men from rational beings into
beasts or puppets, but rather to enable them to develop their mental and physical 
faculties in safety, to use their reason without restraint and to refrain from the 
strife and the vicious mutual abuse that are prompted by hatred, anger or deceit. 
Thus the purpose of the state is, in reality, freedom.42 
Now I guess the question that is of interest to us in the context of this 
symposium is whether this constitutes an account of conscience.  I want 
to defend the idea that it is.  Spinoza’s reference to “beliefs that will inspire 
[the individual] with devotion to God”43 in our first quotation clearly
situates this discussion in the sphere of what we normally associate with 
the topic of conscience, namely conscientious religious belief.  But
Spinoza’s way of framing the issue crucially presents these kinds of 
assertions of religious conscience as a subset—a significant subset, to be
sure, but still merely a subset—of a larger range of conscientious judgments 
that it would be impossible and therefore illegitimate for the state to
dictate.  The natural right that Spinoza is fundamentally interested in
affirming is the right of exercising our “faculty to reason freely and to 
form [one’s] own judgment.”44  That suggests to me that the idea of 
religious conscience, for Spinoza, piggybacks as if it were on an idea of
the inviolability of individual human reason—a conception that, as will 
be clear from the preceding discussion, strikes me as bearing strong links 
 40. SPINOZA, supra note 2, at 230 (“I admit that judgment can be influenced in 
numerous ways . . . .”). 
41. If something is natural, it is simultaneously and for that very reason normative,
and because it is natural for human beings to develop opinions that reflect their own unique 
judgment, this spontaneous capacity for judgment formation and opinion formation 
thereby vindicates itself normatively. Cf. SPINOZA, supra note 2, at 237 (“[T]he real disturbers
of peace are those who, in a free commonwealth, vainly seek to abolish freedom of 
judgment . . . .”).  The project of determining what people think is a self-defeating one, 
and because it is unnatural to attempt the impossible, the naturalness of free judgment is 
thereby vindicated. 
42. Id. at 232. 
43. Id. at 230. 
44. Id.
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to persistent themes in Hobbes.  It is wrong for the state to force the 
conscientious Catholic or Jew to profess Dutch Calvinism for the same 
reason that it is wrong for the Catholic Church to force Galileo to profess 
cognitive beliefs that he conscientiously rejected.  On this account, the core
meaning of conscience is the right of beings possessing natural reason to
exercise their reason according to their own lights and the inviolability
of freely arrived at judgments in the face of agencies of power—whether 
states or churches, or states and churches working in tandem—that are
tempted—whether they can succeed at it or not—to try to negate this
natural right.
My fourth epigraph, the one from Rousseau, expresses exactly the same
conception.  Rousseau also refers to religious conscience when he protests
against the situation in European societies in which “the faith of everyone is
not in the most perfect liberty.”45  But do these limitations on the liberty 
of religious faith exhaust the problem of conscience?  The rest of the text
suggests otherwise.  Like Spinoza, Rousseau identifies the idea of an
“interior of consciences”46 that is impenetrable by power holders with
the steadfast rejection of the notion that “reason could ever be subjected
to authority.”47  And to cite once again the text from Leviathan, chapter 46, 
which was discussed above, when Hobbes inveighs against the error of 
“extend[ing] the power of the Law, which is the Rule of Actions onely, 
to the very Thoughts, and Consciences of men,”48 the phrase “very 
Thoughts, and Consciences of men” seems to carry the implication—on 
my interpretation, at least—that the wrongness of violating the consciences 
of men hangs on the wrongness of violating their thoughts.49  What we 
see here is a consensus on the part of Hobbes, Spinoza, and Rousseau
that conscience and reason, or conscience and thought, belong together. 
Let us consider one additional Spinoza text.  Towards the end of
chapter 20—in the closing pages of the Theological-Political Treatise as 
a whole—Spinoza turns to a discussion of the problem of religious
controversy and how it affects political order in a given society.  He 
celebrates the regime of (relative) religious toleration in the city of
Amsterdam and highlights the benefits that have flowed to Amsterdam 
45. Letter from Rousseau to Voltaire, supra note 4, at 119. 
46. Id.
47. Id.
 48. HOBBES, supra note 1, at 471. 
49. See id.
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from such a regime of toleration.50  Here is the passage in which he 
spells out the lesson that he wishes his readers to draw from the contrast
between times of religious conflict and times of religious peace in the
Dutch experience:
[D]ivisions in the church do not arise from zeal for truth (which breeds only
courtesy and tolerance) but from lust for supremacy.  From this it is clearer than
the sun at noon that the real schismatics [that is, the real disturbers of political 
order] are those who condemn the writings of others and seditiously incite the 
quarrelsome mob against the writers, rather than the writers themselves, who usually
write only for scholars and appeal to reason alone; and that, finally, the real disturbers
of peace are those who, in a free commonwealth, vainly seek to abolish freedom
of judgment, which cannot be suppressed.51 
Although Spinoza does not use the vocabulary of conscience per se, it 
seems perfectly reasonable to consider this an account of the politics of 
conscience, for what is at issue is whether it will promote or undermine 
political order in a society to leave the plurality of religious communities 
free to come to their own conscientious conclusions without external 
coercion.  But this is not the only issue for Spinoza.  The larger issue is
whether one can have a free commonwealth without freedom of judgment, 
and—perhaps especially—what will be the status of independent thinkers
and writers within this regime of free judgment.  Without question, Spinoza 
thinks that a society that embodies religious toleration will secure a more 
stable and more prosperous political order than one that submits theological 
opinions to political and ecclesiastical scrutiny.  But it is clear from this
account that there is far more at stake for Spinoza in the politics of
conscience than the prospect of civil peace between the various sects.
The larger issue is whether Spinoza’s own freedom of philosophizing
can be recognized as a natural right, rather than being subject to endless
peril—the peril of being at the mercy of the mob that is so easily incited 
to persecute philosophers. 
IV. JOHN LOCKE
Last but not least, let us turn to Locke.  The argument supporting 
Locke’s philosophy of conscience is no doubt the most familiar of the 
three accounts surveyed in this essay, so we can probably give it briefer
treatment.  The core purpose of A Letter Concerning Toleration is to
supply a principled basis upon which to distinguish the purposes of
50. See SPINOZA, supra note 2, at 236 (“Take the city of Amsterdam, which enjoys
the fruits of this freedom . . . .”).
51. Id. at 237. 
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government—“Life, Liberty, Health, and Indolency of Body; and the 
Possession of outward things, such as Money, Lands, Houses, Furniture, 
and the like”52—from the purposes of religion—salvation, or “the care of 
Souls”53—such that one can legitimately enforce a categorical separation 
between what magistrates do and what churches do.54  The decisive
alternative posed by Locke’s political philosophy is the liberal separation of
religion and politics versus the theocratic union of religion and politics.55 
There is no question that the appeal to conscience is much more direct
and much more central in Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration than 
it is in either Hobbes or Spinoza.  Consider the following famous text: 
Although the Magistrates Opinion in Religion be sound, and the way that he
appoints be truly Evangelical, yet if I be not thoroughly perswaded
 52. LOCKE, supra note 3, at 26. 
53. Id. at 26–27. 
54. Id. at 33 (“[T]he Church it self is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from
the Commonwealth.  The Boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable.  He jumbles 
Heaven and Earth together, the things most remote and opposite, who mixes these two Societies; 
which are in their Original, End, Business, and in every thing, perfectly distinct, and
infinitely different from each other.”). 
55. Locke asserts that there is a single exception to his categorical separation 
between the sphere of politics and the sphere of religion, namely “the Commonwealth of 
the Jews, [which] different in that from all others, was an absolute Theocracy.”  Id. at 44. 
The claim is that “[t]he Laws established there concerning the Worship of One Invisible 
Deity, were the Civil Laws of that People, and a part of their Political Government; in 
which God himself was the Legislator,” hence in this unique case there was not, nor
could there be, “any difference between that Commonwealth and the Church.”  Id.  For
this reason, the magistrates of that particular theocratic state had no choice but to punish
“Idolaters” who committed apostasy against “the Mosaical Rites.” Id.  Locke goes on:
Now if any one can shew me where there is a Commonwealth, at this time, 
constituted upon that Foundation, I will acknowledge that the Ecclesiastical 
Laws do there unavoidably become a part of the Civil; and that the Subjects of 
that Government both may, and ought to be kept in strict conformity with that 
Church, by the Civil Power.
Id.  But Locke himself, a mere two pages previously, had in fact specified a contemporary
parallel case, namely the Calvinist theocracy in Geneva, and there is certainly no suggestion 
by Locke in his discussion of Geneva that a modern state claiming a theocratic constitution
for itself can be rightly exempted from the liberal principles articulated in A Letter 
Concerning Toleration.  See id. at 42–43.  This principled rejection of theocracy puts Locke in 
theoretical opposition to both Hobbes and Spinoza.  Hobbes was a fully committed theorist of
civil religion, and civil religion, like theocracy, asserts a union of state and church— 
although it does so in order to subordinate the church to unbounded state authority rather than
the reverse.  Spinoza, one might say, had a more schizophrenic view: his political philosophy,
paradoxically, straddles—or, more precisely, alternates between—Hobbesian civil religion
and Lockean tolerationism.  I develop relevant interpretations of Hobbes, Spinoza, and 
Locke in, respectively, chapters 5, 11, and 12 of Civil Religion.  BEINER, supra note 34. 
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thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety for me in following it.  No way 
whatsoever that I shall walk in, against the Dictates of my Conscience, will ever 
bring me to the Mansions of the Blessed.  I may grow rich by an Art that I take
not delight in; I may be cured of some Disease by Remedies that I have not Faith in;
but I cannot be saved by a Religion that I distrust, and by a Worship that I abhor. It
is in vain for an Unbeliever to take up the outward shew of another mans
Profession.  Faith only, and inward Sincerity, are the things that procure acceptance
with God.  The most likely and most approved Remedy can have no effect upon
the Patient, if his Stomach reject it as soon taken.  And you will in vain cram a 
Medicine down a sick mans Throat, which his particular Constitution will be sure to
turn into Poison.  In a word.  Whatsoever may be doubtful in Religion, yet this
at least is certain, that no Religion, which I believe not to be true, can be either
true, or profitable unto me.  In vain therefore do Princes compel their Subjects
to come into their Church-communion, under pretence of saving their Souls.  If
they believe, they will come of their own accord; if they believe not, their
coming will nothing avail them.  How great soever, in fine, may be the pretense
of Good-will, and Charity, and concern for the Salvation of mens Souls, men 
cannot be forced to be saved whether they will or no.  And therefore, when all is
done, they must be left to their own Consciences.56 
Locke calls this “the principal Consideration,” and it is indeed clear that
it is central to his case for toleration.57 
 56. LOCKE, supra note 3, at 38.  Cf. id. at 26–27 (“[N]o Man can, if he would, 
conform his Faith to the Dictates of another.  All the Life and Power of true Religion
consists in the inward and full perswasion of the mind; and Faith is not Faith without 
believing.  What Profession we make, to whatever outward Worship we conform, if we 
are not fully satisfied in our own mind that the one is true, and the other well pleasing
unto God, such Profession and such Practice, far from being any furtherance, are indeed
great Obstacles to our Salvation.  For in this manner, instead of expiating other Sins by
the exercise of Religion, I say in offering thus unto God Almighty such a Worship as we
esteem to be displeasing unto him, we add unto the number of our other sins, those also 
of Hypocrisie, and Contempt of his Divine Majesty.”).  Locke’s reference in this quotation to
the “perswasion of the mind,” as well as his appeal to “the nature of the Understanding”
in the Locke epigraph at the head of this essay, suggests the notion that for Locke the 
distinction between genuine faith and bogus faith hangs on the exercise of free mental
judgment.  See id. (emphasis added).  This in itself situates Locke’s argument in the 
vicinity of Hobbes and Spinoza as we have presented them in this essay.
57. Id. at 38.  For a well-known critique of Locke’s argument, see JEREMY WALDRON, 
LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991, at 88–114 (1993).  Waldron’s basic 
thesis is that Locke’s what-I-think-is-what-I-think-and-no-one-can-force-me-to-think-
differently premise is the sole foundation of his entire case for the self-defeating character of
theocratic politics.  Waldron argues that Jonas Proast, Locke’s chief interlocutor in the 
polemical debate concerning religious toleration, was right to suggest that there are ways
of shaping and influencing people’s conscientious beliefs, short of applying sheer force. 
See id. at 112.  As we saw above, Spinoza conceded this point in his version of the 
argument, and apparently there are places in Locke’s debate with Proast where Locke
makes similar concessions.  See supra note 40 and accompanying text.  For an effective
book-length reply to Waldron’s critique of Locke, see RICHARD VERNON, THE CAREER
OF TOLERATION: JOHN LOCKE, JONAS PROAST, AND AFTER (1997).  The thrust of Vernon’s 
defense of Locke rests on the argument that the range of normative considerations mobilized 
by Locke is much broader than the “principal Consideration” fixed on by Waldron.  See
id. at 21, 29–31. 
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One way of expressing the thesis developed in this paper is to say that 
Locke, in A Letter Concerning Toleration, narrowed the scope of the 
politics of conscience, relative to what it was in Hobbes and Spinoza— 
although it is not to be expected that Locke was less concerned than they 
were with the freedom of philosophizing, for he too was subject to
suspicions of unorthodoxy and to threatened persecution.  The focus now 
is squarely on problems of religious conscience.  Yet Locke’s argument 
certainly had implications—whether he intended them or not—for 
thinkers whose most conscientiously held convictions were not necessarily 
religious ones.  Locke may have been perfectly sincere in arguing that 
his regime of toleration did not encompass those who failed to embrace
some version of theism, but it seems clear enough that the logic of his 
argument extends further.  If toleration flows from acknowledgment of 
the uselessness of coercing conscientious judgment, then this applies not 
only to conscientious religious believers but also, with no less force, to
conscientious religious skeptics.58 
Consider also David Wootton’s formulation of one aspect of Locke’s
theory of toleration: “[According to Locke’s line of thinking,] I ought to 
regard my right to think for myself as inalienable.  In no rational original
contract will I cede control over belief to the magistrate.”59  Wootton’s 
formulation suggests that for Locke as well the notion of religious
conscience is simply a particular application of a broader conception of
conscientious believing what one believes.  Richard Vernon makes the 
similar point that Locke’s insistence that “the care . . . of every man’s
soul belongs unto himself, and is to be left unto himself,”60 although it is
motivated by a certain conception of what it is to hold religious beliefs 
runs parallel to what he thinks the state may or may not do by way of
regulating the nonreligious sphere of life.61  Once again, the idea of 
religious conscience seems parasitical, so to speak, on the more
fundamental idea of intellectual conscience: the “right to think for myself.” 
However, Wootton goes on to argue that Locke is much less adequate as
58. Cf. WALDRON, supra note 7, at ch. 8.
 59. David Wootton, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE: POLITICAL WRITINGS 7, 99
(David Wootton ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2003) (1993) (emphasis added). 
 60. VERNON, supra note 57, at 149 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
61. Id.
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a theorist of intellectual freedom than he is as a theorist of religious 
freedom.62 
V. CONCLUSION
Let us recapitulate our main theme.  If we want to trace the origins of 
the discourse of conscience, we need above all to go back to the
seventeenth century.  It was in that century that key thinkers decided to
mount an intellectual resistance to the fundamental power structures 
governing European societies, especially with respect to clerical hegemony
within those societies.  All of this came to fruition in the eighteenth 
century Enlightenment, but the intellectual seeds were planted in the
cohort of thinkers spanning Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and Pierre Bayle. 
But when one looks more closely at how the theme of conscience functions 
in their key texts, we see that they were fundamentally concerned more 
with the problem of how to think freely than with that of how to believe
freely.  Issues of religious conscience were certainly not absent, but they
were secondary to issues of intellectual conscience. What was ultimately
at stake in the seventeenth century birth of the politics of conscience was 
not just the liberation of sects from theocratic politics but the liberation
of minds from ecclesiastical domination. 
 62. Wootton, supra note 59, at 104–10.  Cf.  JONATHAN I. ISRAEL, RADICAL
ENLIGHTENMENT 265–70 (2001) (offering a sharp statement of the contrast between
Spinoza and Locke on issues of toleration and conscience). 
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